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Abstract
Simultaneous reproduction of all financial stylized facts is so difficult that most
existing stochastic process-based and agent-based models are unable to achieve
the goal. In this study, by extending the decision-making structure of Minority
Game, we propose a novel agent-based model called “Speculation Game,” for
a better reproducibility of the stylized facts. The new model has three distinct
characteristics comparing with preceding agent-based adaptive models for the
financial market: the enabling of nonuniform holding and idling periods, the
inclusion of magnitude information of price change in history, and the imple-
mentation of a cognitive world for the evaluation of investment strategies with
capital gains and losses. With these features, Speculation Game succeeds in
reproducing 10 out of the currently well studied 11 stylized facts under a single
parameter setting.
Keywords: Econophysics, Multi-agent simulation, Financial stylized facts,
Cognitive model, Round-trip trading
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Stylized facts are qualitative properties of asset returns, which are indicated
as the result of more than half a century of empirical statistical studies on fi-
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nancial time series [1]. The 11 currently reported stylized facts can be listed as
follows: volatility clustering, intermittency, heavy tails, the absence of autocor-
relation in returns, slow decay of autocorrelation in volatilities, volume/volatility
correlation, aggregational Gaussianity, conditional heavy tails, asymmetry in
time scales, leverage effect and gain/loss asymmetry. They are quite nontrivial
features which have been well studied for many years in different markets and
for various instruments.
The reproducibility of the stylized facts is a prerequisite for the financial
market model. However, to reproduce them with a conventional market model,
whether a simple or sophisticated stochastic process, is not very easy due to the
high level of multiplexity of the market. With the contribution of econometrists,
several well known stochastic models have been constructed to yield typical
stylized features, for example, the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
(ARCH) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH)
processes [2, 3]. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, most existing models
fail to reproduce the whole set of stylized properties simultaneously.
On the other hand, an alternative approach mainly advocated by econo-
physicists, which adopts agent simulation based on a set of simple rules, has
been used to study the stylized facts as well. The simulation enables the re-
production and analysis of complex price dynamics in an artificial market with
autonomous agents acting as the traders. Compared with previous stochas-
tic process models, which are designed to describe the traits of financial time
series at the macroscopic level, this method is a bottom-up approach which ex-
plains these features at the microscopic level, that is, the level at which traders’
decision-making and trading behaviors are taking into account.
There are mainly two reasons for adopting agent-based models. First, the
agent-based simulation is almost the only way to analyze the effects of traders’
behavior to the whole market. All time-series data obtained from the real mar-
ket, such as price and volume, are aggregational ones, which is generally im-
possible to be used in tracking the individual actions of all market participants.
Stochastic process models have a high ability to address macroscopic phenom-
2
ena, but analyses based on such models ignore those endogenous factors, such
as mutual interaction among traders. Second, multi-agent simulation can offer
a scenario that explains the generation process of emergent phenomena, which
were essentially regarded as a black box in the traditional financial analyses. On
the other hand, analyses with agent simulation can provide, at least partially, a
reasonable scenario for such a complex problem.
As physicists tend to believe that all phenomena in this world could be
subject to some simple universal rules at the basic level, several “simple” agent-
based models have been proposed. Specifically, these simple models have the
following characteristics:
1. A bottom-up structure.
2. Elements (agents) governed by simple rules appropriately abstracted from
real traders’ behavior.
3. Aggregational output (e.g., price change) in statistical agreement with the
real data.
In particular, the second point is important because the simplicity of agents’
rules allows relatively easier analysis of mechanisms responsible for the compli-
cated price dynamics. A tractable model like such is called a toy model.
Note that the agent-based model proposed by economists often loosens the
requirement of simplicity in the microstructure and pursues agents’ behavioral
rules as sophisticated as possible. Examples of such a complex agent-based
market model are the Santa Fe Institute model [4, 5, 6] and the Genoa artificial
stock market model [7, 8]. Compared with toy models, these complex agent-
based market models have higher reproducibility of stylized facts, but they are
more difficult to use in identifying critical factors at the microscopic level and
in linking these factors to the aggregational outputs.
Typically, toy models for financial markets can be divided into two groups de-
pending on whether a learning mechanism is included: zero-intelligence models
and adaptive models. The representative zero-intelligence models are the perco-
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lation model [9, 10], Ising (spin) model 1 [11, 12, 13, 14], empirical order-driven
model [15, 16, 17, 18], and Sznajd model 2 [20]. The famous adaptive models
include the Lux-Marchesi model [21], Minority Game [22, 23] and its extended
versions, such as the grand canonical Minority Game (GCMG) [24, 25, 26], $-
game [27], and pattern game [28]. Previous studies using these agent-based toy
models achieved remarkable progress in the analysis of market dynamics. For
example, the family of Minority Game typed models revealed that the stylized
facts of price returns can arise as long as agents have possibility to adaptively
modulate their investment. Particularly, this is understood as a combination of
inductive learning with dynamic capitals [29, 30] or a switch between ‘active’
and ‘inactive’ strategies depending on their performance [24, 31], both of which
would result in a herding behavior among traders [32].
Meanwhile, toy models might also overlook some fundamental factors and
fail in reproducing the related stylized facts. For instance, the payoff strategy
of Minority Game results in a mean-reverting aggregated outcome, which is a
main cause for the loss of price diffusivity. This feature might be relieved if
the investing strategies were evaluated with capital gains and losses by round-
trip trades, as Katahira and Akiyama pointed out in their study [33]. In our
opinion, a toy model that allows a little more sophistication, but not to the
extent of the complex agent-based market models, has the potential to enhance
the reproducibility of stylized facts, and at the same time retain the advantage
of being able to find the latent mechanisms easily.
1.2. Purpose
In this research, we build an agent-based toy model for the financial markets,
named “Speculation Game,” with more realistic factors in order to obtain a bet-
ter reproducibility of the stylized facts. In particular, three extensions are made
1Some Ising models such as [11, 12] also incorporate learning mechanisms so that they
could be classified as the adaptive model as well.
2It was originally a mathematical model for opinion formation. The use of this model for
financial markets is one example of its applications [19].
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to preceding models: the enabling of nonuniform holding and idling periods,
the inclusion of magnitude information of price change to history, and the
implementation of a cognitive world for the evaluation of investment strategies
with capital gains and losses. The focus of our study is not merely the perfect
reproduction of all the stylized facts, but the fulfillment of the prerequisite as
a useful financial market model for Speculation Game. In fact, elucidation of
the emerging mechanism of stylized facts is more crucial than the reproduction
itself, which will be the main theme of our next paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the model, and Section 3 presents the results and discussion. Finally,
Section 4 summarizes the study.
2. Model
2.1. Model design
As the kind of bounded rationality discussed by W. Brian as “The El Farol
Bar Problem” [34] is implemented, Minority Game can be considered as one
of the most insightful toy models regarding human inductive behavior for the
complex adaptive system including financial markets. An abstract decision-
making process is provided for each player in the game with the specifications
of history, memory, and strategy.
Speculation Game is constructed by exploring the decision-making structure
of Minority Game. To develop our model, these structures are utilized and a
minimum set of rules enabling the round-trip trading is designed.
2.2. Gaming system
In Speculation Game, N players participate a gamified market, competing
with each other to increase their wealth by capital gains through round-trip
trades 3.
3Ferreira and Marsili [35] attempt to introduce a round-trip trade into Minority Game, but
it is restricted as a successive two-step transaction. The pattern game proposed by Challet
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At each time step t, player i takes an action ai(t) from three alternatives
4—buy (= 1), sell (= −1), and hold (idle) (= 0)—based on information of past
price movements, called history 5. Note that action 0 is explained as “hold”
during an ongoing round-trip trade, and as “idle” during the waiting period
before the opening of a new position. The history of price change is represented
as a quinary time series H(t): largely up (= 2), up (= 1), stay(= 0), down
(= −1), and largely down (= −2). The player with memory M can refer to the
last M digits of H(t), shown as Equation 1, in which h(t) is a quantized price
movement at time step t as,
H(t) = (h(t−M), · · · , h(t− 1)). (1)
Note that H(0) is randomly initialized.
When a trading decision is to be made, every player uses a strategy table
to determine recommended action corresponding to the historical patterns (see
Table 1). The total number of strategies is 35
M
since players have three choices
and there are 5M possible histories. For the realization of round-trip trades, a
player will take “hold” action either if action 0 is recommended by the strategy
table, or if the recommendation (1 or −1) is the same as the action in opening
positions. This rule enables each player to manage the timing of opening and
closing positions in reference with buying and selling signals encoded in price
movements. Under such a constraint for the completion of round-trip trades,
players’ actions are not only determined by investing strategies but also by their
trading statuses (i.e., opened or closed positions). This situation will impede
the synchronized actions among the players (see Appendix A for details).
In addition, while a genuine or a fake history is not essential to proceed
Minority Game [37], a history generated from the actual price changes is required
in Speculation Game for the players to find out profitable opportunities, which
[28] incorporates round-trip payoffs by taking account of the reaction time of order placement.
4Chow and Chau [36] analyze Minority Game in which every player has more than two
choices.
5History in Minority Game records the past minority groups.
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Table 1: Example of a strategy for M = 3.
History Recommended action
−2 −2 −2 1
−2 −2 −1 0
−2 −2 0 0
−2 −2 1 −1
−2 −2 2 1
−2 −1 −2 0
...
...
2 2 2 −1
will largely influence the aggregational results. With these significant differences
from Minority Game, Speculation Game can be regarded as a different type of
agent-based model although the basic elements such as history, memory, and
strategy tables are borrowed from it.
Player i of Speculation Game possesses randomly chosen S strategies and
uses his or her most successful strategy in terms of the accumulated strategy
gains Gji (t) (j ∈ S) at each time step. In addition, unused strategies are eval-
uated as if they were used. Whenever a trade is closed by the strategy in use,
performances of all the strategies are reviewed to find the one with the best
performance. If the best strategy happens to be the current one, the player
continues to use it. However, if the best strategy turns out to be a strategy that
is not in use (i.e., different from the current strategy) with which a virtual trade
might be still ongoing, the virtual position is cleared immediately and the player
switches to use it at the next time step. Note that when a virtual round-trip
trade is aborted by switching the best strategy, the accumulated strategy gains
Gji (t) will not be updated.
Players in Speculation Game can place an order with variable trading vol-
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umes 6. The quantities of order which is allowed for player i to place depends
on his or her market wealth wi(t) as follows,
qi(t) = bwi(t)
B
c. (2)
B is the board lot amount, which describes the ease of placing orders with
multiple quantities and is a significant parameter for the dynamical evolution of
the players’ market wealth. Equation 2 implies that a player with ample wealth
(e.g., a big speculator, such as a hedge fund in the real market) can place an
order with massive quantities. Note that opening and closing volumes of a
round-trip trade are required to be the same. Moreover, the amount of initial
market wealth for each player is decided by a uniformly distributed random
number U [0, 100) as
wi(0) = bB + U [0, 100)c, (3)
in order to enable the player to place a unit volume order at least.
For market price change ∆p, which will be used in formulating the decision
making process of players, we simply follow the order imbalance equation defined
as the function of excess demand D(t) in the reference of Cont and Bouchaud
[9],
∆p = p(t)− p(t− 1) = D(t)
N
, (4)
where N works as the “depth” of game market. While the log-return of price is
adopted in such an order imbalance relationship for GCMG models [24, 25, 26],
we assume that the price change is directly driven by the excess demand because
a cognitive threshold is introduced in Speculation Game as shown in Equation
6 7. The reason is that, for an ordinary trader in the real market, it is not
natural to set a cognitive threshold for log-return, which would require an extra
6GCMG introducing evolving capital with variable investments are studied in [29, 30, 38,
39]. The Patzelt-Pawelzik model [40] also takes a similar approach.
7There is no absolute rule with which the price change or the log-return of price should
be applied to this kind of order imbalance equation. Indeed, the price change is used in the
Cont-Bouchaud percolation model [10].
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calculation from the price chart, instead of price change. In the test simulations,
if log-return were used for the price formations, some extreme fluctuations of
market price could be observed due to the loss of function for the cognitive
threshold.
The initial market price can be arbitrarily chosen to a certain extent as long
as it is large enough to avoid the appearance of negative prices. In this paper,
it is set as p(0) = 100. Also, the excess demand D(t) is calculated with the
quantities qi(t) and also the actions a
j∗
i (t) recommended by strategy j
∗ in use:
D(t) =
N∑
i=1
aj
∗
i (t)qi(t). (5)
Furthermore, the definition of price change in Equation 4 implies the presence
of a market maker who provides sufficient liquidity in the game market; hence,
the excess demand can always be balanced instantly by a counterpart.
The quantized price movement h(t) is determined based on the definition of
∆p in Equation 4 as follows:
h(t) =

2 (∆p > C)
1 (C ≥ ∆p > 0)
0 (∆p = 0)
−1 (−C ≤ ∆p < 0)
−2 (∆p < −C)
. (6)
The cognitive threshold C is used to discriminate the significant price changes
(recognized as a big move by the players) from insignificant ones. Since the
cognized historyH(t) only contains very rough information about the magnitude
of ∆p, a kind of designated coarse price P (t), instead of the market price p(t),
needs to be prepared for the players to make their decisions properly. Note
that Speculation Game would not work well if players evaluated their strategies
directly with the market price. Indeed, no player could make a profit in that
case because of the inconsistency between the preciseness of information in the
cognized history and that in the market price. Hence, an assumption is made
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that players calculate their gain or loss of investment only in their cognitive
worlds, where also their trading decisions are made. This assumption (i.e., the
evaluation with simplified payoffs rather than real ones) is consistent with the
empirical study done by De et al. [41], which reveals that investors have a
cognitive bias such that their current trading decisions are more influenced by
the sign of outcomes of past trades (positive or negative) rather than the actual
size of those. In the current study, P (t) is defined as the cognitive price, which
is calculated as follows, letting P (0) = 0,
P (t) = P (t− 1) + h(t). (7)
Accordingly, the players’ strategy gains are calculated based on this cognitive
price. If player i with strategy j opens a position at time step t0 and closes it
at time step t, his or her strategy gain in this round-trip trade is:
∆Gji (t) = a
j
i (t0)(P (t)− P (t0)). (8)
The performance of strategy j of player i is measured by its accumulated strat-
egy gain as follows:
Gji (t) = G
j
i (t0) + ∆G
j
i (t). (9)
The player’s market wealth wi(t) is updated in a similar way with the order
quantities qi(t) taken into consideration. When the strategy in use is j
∗, ∆Gj
∗
i (t)
shall be converted into the player’s investment adjustment as
∆wi(t) = f(∆G
j∗
i (t)qi(t0)), (10)
where f can be an arbitrary monotonically increasing function. In the following
texts, ∆wi(t) = ∆G
j∗
i (t)qi(t0) is used for simplicity. Note that this ∆wi(t)
would be different from the one calculated directly based on the market price.
Here, we assume the difference could be adjusted externally. In other words,
self-finance is not postulated in Speculation Game. After the adjustment, the
market wealth of player i is updated as follows:
wi(t) = wi(t0) + ∆wi(t). (11)
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As the difference between Equations 9 and 11 shows, the unit volume gain is
applied for the calculation of strategy performance. This is because strategies
ought to be evaluated only in terms of the timing of order placement. The
framework of the model explained so far is summarized in Figure 1. As the
figure shows, Speculation Game proceeds with the players behaving alternately
in the realistic and in the cognitive worlds.
Figure 1: The mutual projection between the realistic and cognitive worlds in Speculation
Game.
In addition, each player enters or exits the game market depending on his
or her market wealth. When wi(t) < B, which means that the player does
not have enough wealth to order even a minimal unit, then the player has to
withdraw from the market. In this case, an alternative player will enter as a
substitute with a new set of S strategies randomly given, and an initial market
wealth generated by bB + U [0, 100)c.
To sum up, in a different way from Minority Game typed models, both the
concepts of ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ of players [24, 31] and dynamic capitals [29, 30]
are implemented in this model by realizing round-trip trades with variable order
11
quantities.
3. Results and discussions: Reproducibility of stylized facts
In order to assess Speculation Game for the reproducibility of the stylized
facts, we calculate the market price return as r(t) = ln(p(t)) − ln(p(t − 1)) (to
follow the analysis method in previous studies) and study the 11 specific stylized
facts reported by Cont [1], which have been acknowledged for a long time as
the general qualitative characteristics of financial markets. The simulations are
conducted under a fixed parameter setting: N = 1000, M = 5, S = 2, B = 9,
C = 3. This baseline calculation only serves as a demonstration of Speculation
Game; stylized facts can also be reproduced under other parameter settings,
which will be detailed in another paper.
3.1. Volatility clustering and intermittency
Volatility clustering is the tendency of large changes in price returns to clus-
ter together [1, 24, 42]. In other words, price fluctuates violently once volatility,
generally measured by |r(t)| or r(t)2, increases and vice versa. This feature in-
troduces heavy tails in the distribution of returns and has a strong relationship
to the slow decay of autocorrelation in volatilities.
Meanwhile, intermittency describes the presence of intermittent bursts at
any time scale in the time series of price returns. In other words, a phase
with large volatilities alters chaotically with a phase with small volatilities,
with varying lengths of periods of these interchanges. This kind of aperiodic
instability can also be observed in several physical systems and known as on-off
intermittency in the physics literature [21, 43]. Mantegna and Stanley [3] indeed
noticed the similarity between the price changes in financial markets and the
velocity fluctuations in turbulence.
Speculation Game succeeded in reproducing volatility clustering and inter-
mittency. Figure 2 displays a yielded time series of r(t), where irregular erup-
tions with large volatilities clustering together can be observed. Note that there
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are also some cases (under different parameter settings) in which the system
enters the extreme state instead of the volatility clustering state (see Appendix
B).
-0.08
-0.04
0
0.04
0.08
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
r(
t)
t
Figure 2: The intermittent time series of r(t) displays a temporal structure of volatility
clustering in Speculation Game.
3.2. Heavy tails
The distribution of price returns is known to have a heavier tailed character
than Gaussian distribution does. The cumulative distribution function is defined
as
Fr(x) = Pr[r(t) ≤ x], (12)
which seems to display a power-law or Pareto-like tail with tail index α, which
is finite (2 < α < 5) for most data sets studied 8 [1]. Note that the probability
distribution becomes Le´vy-stable distribution with an infinite variance when
0 < α < 2 and Gaussian distribution when α = 2 [3, 45].
In Figure 3, the blue circled dots show the averaged probability distribution
of market price returns for 50,000 time steps obtained from 100 trials of the
simulation of Speculation Game. The returns are normalized to plot Figure
8Nevertheless, most power-law functions found in previous empirical studies were visually
fitted with the least-square method, so it requires to be double-checked by the more reliable
statistical techniques recently proposed by Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman [44].
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3, in which the vertical axis is in log scale. The return distribution obtained
in Speculation Game evidently possesses a fatter tail than that of Gaussian
distribution, which is shown as the green line in the same figure.
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Figure 3: The distribution of price returns shows heavier tails than those of Gaussian distri-
bution.
Moreover, the averaged (complementary) cumulative distributions of its pos-
itive and negative tails, F+r (x) = Pr[r(t) ≥ x] and F−r (x) = Pr[r(t) ≤ x], shown
as the blue circles and red squares in Figure 4, seems to be subject to a power
law. The green line is the asymptotic power-law function with α ' 3.8, which
stays in the range of tail exponents: 2 < α < 5, and agrees with the inverse
cubic law of returns [46].
To check the robustness of power-law distribution, we also conducted Vuong’s
test [47] to compare it with the exponential distribution as a competing alterna-
tive, by using the “poweRlaw” package [48]. This package contains R functions
for fitting, comparing and visualizing heavy-tailed distributions, which are based
on the statistical techniques proposed by Clauset et al [44]. Since its calcula-
tion time expands exponentially as the data size increases, we only analyze the
normalized positive returns generated from 10-trial simulations in this study.
Figure 5 is drawn by finding the lower cut-off of asymptotic power-law function
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Figure 4: Cumulative distributions of price returns displays an asymptotic power law. The
blue circles stand for the cumulative distribution of the positive tail and the red squares for
the negative tail.
with the package. The red line is a fitted power-law function with α = 3.869,
whereas the green dashed line is a fitted exponential function. The red line
apparently fits better than the green dashed line to the distribution. The likeli-
hood ratio is LR = 10.70 and the p-value is p = 0.00 (p < 0.1). Hence, Vuong’s
test also concludes that the power-law distribution is closer to the true one.
3.3. The absence of autocorrelation in returns
Asset returns in liquid markets typically do not exhibit any significant au-
tocorrelation, defined as
ρr(τ) = Corr(r(t+ τ), r(t)), (13)
where τ is the time lag. ρr(τ) exponentially decays within very small time scales
(' 20 min) [1, 3]. The absence of significant linear autocorrelation in returns
is often cited as a support for the efficient market hypothesis [49], as arbitrage
opportunities are consumed rapidly.
Figure 6 demonstrates that market price returns yielded by Speculation
Game do not display substantial autocorrelation. The two green lines repre-
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Figure 5: The power-law function (red line) fits the cumulative distribution of the positive
returns better than the exponential function (green dashed line) does. These results are
obtained from the “poweRlaw” package [48] analysis of 249,327 data generated by 10 runs of
simulations.
sent the 95% confidence interval of a Gaussian random walk. The correlation
decays within this confidence interval from τ > 13.
3.4. Slow decay of autocorrelation in volatilities
In contrast to fast decay of autocorrelation of returns, the autocorrelation
function of absolute returns (volatilities) decays slowly as a function of the time
lag τ , defined by
ρv(τ) = Corr(|r(t+ τ)|, |r(t)|). (14)
The preceding empirical studies show that the decay of ρv(τ) seems to roughly
obey either a power law 9 [1, 3] or logarithmic one [50]; there is no consensus yet
in the literature about the functional form of the decaying ρv(τ) [51]. The slow
9This power-law behavior also needs to be reexamined by the recent statistical techniques
of Clauset et al [44].
16
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
ρ r
(τ
)
τ
Figure 6: The autocorrelation of price returns decays more rapidly than the autocorrelation
of volatilities. It enters into the noise zone (between the green lines) at 14 time lags. This
result is the average of 100 trials of the simulation for 50,000 time steps.
decay can be interpreted as a sign of long-range dependence (long memory),
causing volatilities to cluster together according to their magnitudes.
Figure 7 displays the 100-trial averaged autocorrelation of absolute returns
with the same data sets used for Figure 6. The figure indicates that correlations
remain positive till τ = 103, however, ρv(τ) decays exponentially with an ex-
ponent: 6.0× 10−3 for τ ≤ 100, which is comparable to the statistical analysis
of real data. For example, the decay exponents of autocorrelation of absolute
return is 5.0×10−3 for gold (daily index: 1978.12.29 – 2018.8.10) and 7.0×10−3
for IBM stock (daily price: 1962.1.2 – 2018.8.17).
3.5. Volume/volatility correlation
The trading volume is well known to correlate positively with all measures
of volatility [52, 53], implying that larger price movements are accompanied by
higher trading volumes.
By allowing orders with variable quantities, Speculation Game enables us to
express the correlation between the averaged trading volume and volatility for
an arbitrary time horizon. The total quantities of buy and sell orders at time
17
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Figure 7: The slow decay of autocorrelation of volatilities. Inset: The first 100-time lags decay
can be regressed to an exponential function: ρv(τ) = 0.2853e−0.006τ , as the green line shown.
step t, Qbuy(t) and Qsell(t), are calculated respectively as
Qbuy(t) =
N∑
i=1
qi(t)δai(t),1, Qsell(t) =
N∑
i=1
qi(t)δai(t),−1, (15)
where the generalized Kronecker deltas are defined as follows:
δai(t),1 =
0 (ai(t) 6= 1)1 (ai(t) = 1) , δai(t),−1 =
0 (ai(t) 6= −1)1 (ai(t) = −1) . (16)
The averaged trading volume 〈V (t)〉 for time scale ∆t can be calculated as
follows:
〈V (t)〉 = max{〈Qbuy(t)〉, 〈Qsell(t)〉}, (17)
where 〈〉 stands for averaging over the given time scale.
Figure 8 is a scatter plot between the averaged trading volume and the
averaged volatility for ∆t = 5 with the same data sets as used for Figure 2. The
figure displays their strong correlation with a coefficient: Corr(〈V (t)〉, 〈|r(t)|〉) '
0.84, showing the capability of Speculation Game in reproducing one of the
major stylized facts. Note that the correlation tends to become stronger as ∆t
increases.
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Figure 8: The positive correlation between the averaged trading volumes and volatilities in
Speculation Game.
3.6. Aggregational Gaussianity
The distribution of returns approaches Gaussian distribution as the time
scale ∆t, over which the returns are calculated, increases [42, 54, 55]. In other
words, the shape of the distribution is not identical at different time scales.
The excess degree of kurtosis can be used to describe quantitatively the
difference in forms of distribution in reference with Gaussian. Assuming that
the return calculated at time scale ∆t is r(t,∆t), its kurtosis κ(∆t) is defined
as follows using its standard deviation σ(∆t):
κ(∆t) =
〈(r(t,∆t)− 〈r(t,∆t)〉)4〉
σ(∆t)4
− 3. (18)
The greater positive value of κ(∆t) means that the return distribution has a
sharper peak and fatter tails. Hence, the aggregational Gaussianity can be
interpreted as a phenomenon in which the kurtosis κ(∆t) decreases as the time
scale ∆t increases.
Figure 9 shows the change of averaged kurtoses (over 100 trials) by applying
different time scales for calculating the returns. In Figure 9, κ(∆t) tends to
decrease as the time scale increases, which seems to be consistent with the
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observation that the distribution of returns has a power-law tail outside of Le´vy-
stable regime.
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Figure 9: The aggregational Gaussianity is recovered in Speculation Game. Each set of data
at ∆t = 5, 10, · · · , 1280 is calculated based on the market price returns at ∆t = 1 for 50,000
time steps.
Although the result indicates the capability of Speculation Game in repro-
ducing the aggregational Gaussianity, this property is not robust when ∆t ≤ 20
in which κ(∆t) could increase even a 100-trial average is performed. Note that
the loss of the aggregational Gaussianity in short time scales is not only a phe-
nomenon appearing in this model, but also an observation in the real market
[56]. In fact, Johnson et al. [39] had pointed out that a time scale of ∆t ≥ 60
min is generally required in order to approximate the probability distribution
of return as Gaussian distribution. This is because the assumptions of i.i.d.
(independent and identically distributed) return and finite variance do not hold
in short time scales.
3.7. Conditional heavy tails
The volatility clustering phenomena may also be recovered to a certain extent
by GARCH-type models. However, even after correcting returns for volatility
clustering, the probability distribution of the residual time series still possesses
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heavy tails, which are defined as conditional heavy tails and are less heavy than
those in the original distribution of returns [1].
In a GARCH(p, q) process, return rt is described with volatility σ
2
t as follows
[2], 
rt = σtt
σ2t = a0 +
q∑
i=1
air
2
t−i +
p∑
j=1
bjσ
2
t−j
, (19)
where p and q are non-negative integers, a0 > 0, ai ≥ 0 (i = 1, · · · , q), bj ≥ 0
(j = 1, · · · , p), and t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1). To reduce conditional heavy tails, various
types of heavy-tailed distributions, such as the Student’s t distribution [57], the
generalized error distribution (GED) [58], and so on are introduced into the
GARCH framework [59].
The price returns from Speculation Game have the conditional heavy tails.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of normalized returns with the same data sets
used for Figure 2 (the red squares) and the distribution of its residuals with the
GARCH(1, 1) model (the blue circles), against Gaussian (the green line). The
residual distribution exhibits fatter tails than those of Gaussian distribution,
but thinner than those of the return distribution.
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Figure 10: Conditional heavy tails observed from the distribution of price returns generated
in Speculation Game.
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3.8. Asymmetry in time scales
Asymmetry in time scales is a feature that relates to volatilities of differ-
ent time resolutions. In particular, coarse-grained volatility predicts fine-scale
volatility better than the other way around, which indicates that price informa-
tion flows from the coarse to the fine time scale.
The asymmetry in time scales is described by the lead–lag correlation with
respect to the time lag τ between the two time resolutions. First, coarse volatil-
ity vc(t) and fine volatility vf (t) are defined as follows with time scale ∆t [42, 60],
vc(ti) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
r(ti−1 + j∆t,∆t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (20)
vf (ti) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
|r(ti−1 + j∆t,∆t)| . (21)
∆t has a relationship as ∆t = (ti − ti−1)/n and vf (t) can also be defined
without 1/n to take an average [61]. For example, when ∆t = 1 d and n = 5,
vc(t) and vf (t) represent the weekly based volatility and the (averaged) daily
based volatility, respectively.
The lead–lag correlation ρcf (τ) between v
c(t) and vf (t) is calculated as
follows:
ρcf (τ) = Corr(v
c(t+ τ), vf (t)). (22)
If one plots ρcf (τ) against τ with market data, the function of ρcf (τ) will be
linearly asymmetric with respect to the τ = 0 line. To show the asymmetry
quantitatively, the difference of correlations ρcf (τ)− ρcf (−τ) and the 95% con-
fidence interval of a Gaussian random walk are compared with each other. In
particular, the negative difference of correlations is out of the confidence interval
when |τ | is small (|τ | = 1, or 2). In other words, the correlation between past
coarse and future fine volatilities (ρcf (τ) when τ < 0) is meaningfully bigger
than that between past fine and future coarse volatilities (ρcf (τ) when τ > 0).
Accordingly, the relationship of the lead–lag correlation indicates that coarse
volatilities can predict fine ones more effectively.
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The asymmetry in time scales can also be observed in Speculation Game.
Figure 11 displays ρcf (τ) with v
c(t) and vf (t) calculated at regular intervals
of 50 time steps by setting ∆t = 10 and n = 5. The lead-lag correlation is
calculated with the use of the market price returns for 50,000 time steps and
averaged over 100 trials. The linear asymmetry of ρcf (τ) (the blue circles) with
respect to τ = 0 can be found in Figure 11. In addition, the difference of
correlations ρcf (τ)− ρcf (−τ) (the red squares at the bottom) is outside of the
95% confidence interval of a Gaussian random walk (the area between the two
green lines) when |τ | ≤ 3.
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Figure 11: Asymmetric lead–lag correlation of coarse and fine volatilities in Speculation Game.
Blue circles represent the lead-lag correlation, and red squares the difference of correlations.
The 95% confidence interval of a Gaussian random walk is indicated as the zone between two
green lines.
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3.9. Leverage effect
The leverage effect is a property by which future volatilities are negatively
correlated with past returns [62, 63, 64]. The leverage effect is measured by the
following function with time lag τ ,
L(τ) =
〈[r(t+ τ)]2r(t)〉
〈r(t)2〉2 . (23)
L(τ) is intrinsically the same as Corr(|r(t + τ)|2, r(t)) but has higher measur-
ing sensitivity than Corr(|r(t + τ)|2, r(t)) does, since it is calculated without
subtracting the respective averages, and the dimensions of the numerator and
denominator are different. In addition, unlike the correlation coefficient, L(τ)
takes a value less than −1 and more than 1.
If L(τ) is plotted against τ using real market data, L(τ) would behave differ-
ently crossing the τ = 0 boundary. L(τ) generally takes negligible values when
τ < 0, though the empirical study for stock indices [62] shows large positive
correlations up to |τ | = 4 d. On the other hand, when τ > 0, L(τ) takes signif-
icant negative values near τ = 0 and gradually increases to zero as τ increases,
meaning that there is a relatively large negative correlation between returns
and volatilities when the time lag is small. Note that the leverage correlation is
stronger but decays faster for stock indices than for individual stocks [63].
The leverage effect is successfully reproduced in Speculation Game. Figure
12 displays the 100-trial averaged L(τ) calculated by the market price returns
for 50,000 time steps. As shown in the figure, for positive values of τ , L(τ)
drops almost up to −20 when τ is small. Meanwhile, L(τ) tends to be scattered
around zero for negative values of τ . Interestingly, we also find some significant
positive correlations up to about |τ | = 5, which is quite similar to the result of
empirical study [62].
3.10. Gain/loss asymmetry
Gain/loss asymmetry refers to the difference in the range of movements
between upward and downward directions in stock prices and stock index values.
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Figure 12: The leverage effect reproduced in Speculation Game.
Note that this trait is not observed in foreign exchange rates that have a higher
symmetry in up/down moves [1].
The inverse statistics method is used to confirm the gain/loss asymmetry
[64, 65, 66]. This method studies the change in time by the change in price
whereas normal financial statistics usually conduct the analysis the other way
around. In particular, one decides a return level θ arbitrarily and measures the
least time steps T±θ(t) required for the market price p(t) to reach p± θ. With
the return r(t,∆t), T±θ(t) can be calculated as follows,
T±θ(t) =
inf{∆t | r(t,∆t) ≥ +θ}inf{∆t | r(t,∆t) ≤ −θ} . (24)
T±θ(t) is called an investment horizon [67], since it is conceivable as the nec-
essary time to achieve a desirable price change. If one calculates the occurring
probability of T±θ(t) for all time steps, an asset featuring the gain/loss asym-
metry would exhibit a higher probability in the case of −θ than in the case of
+θ, especially in short time ranges. This means that the price decreases more
frequently than it increases in relatively short periods, or more simply, the price
falls faster than it rises.
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However, the gain/loss asymmetry cannot be reproduced in Speculation
Game. Figure 13 shows the 100-trial averaged gain/loss probability distribu-
tions Pr[Tθ] for 50,000 time steps by setting the return level as θ = ±0.01.
There is no significant difference in Pr[Tθ] between θ = 0.01 (the blue circles)
and θ = −0.01 (the red squares), meaning that the gain and loss are symmetric.
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Figure 13: Similar distributions of gain/loss investment horizons.
The reason for the symmetry of Tθ distribution probably lies in the sym-
metric nature of Speculation Game, as the game players are designed to react
with no difference either to upward or to downward price movements. In reality,
traders may have different reactions to different price movements, in agreement
with prospect theory which states that there is a tendency of risk aversion toward
gain or loss of money [68]. Therefore, the introduction of such an asymmetric
attitude to the model design might be helpful to reproduce the gain/loss asym-
metry.
4. Conclusion
This study proposes a new, simple agent-based model for the financial mar-
kets, which takes account of the speculative behavior pursuing capital gains
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through round-trip trades. In particular, Speculation Game has three distin-
guishes itself from other agent based models in three aspects: the enabling of
nonuniform holding and idling periods, the inclusion of magnitude information
of price change to history, and the implementation of a cognitive world for the
evaluation of investing strategies.
Table 2 summarizes the reproducibility of stylized facts for Speculation
Game. Symbol “+” shows that the model successfully recovers the property,
and symbol “−” means that it does not. In the table, it shows that 10 out of 11
stylized facts have been reproduced in the multi-agent simulation with Specu-
lation Game. Note that these reproductions are achieved simultaneously under
the same parameter setting. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other
model capable of reproducing the stylized facts at once up to this level, irre-
spective of the stochastic processes, or the agent-based complex and toy models.
Furthermore, we may expect that the remaining unachieved stylized fact could
be recovered by introducing the aspect of asymmetric human behavior in the
current model.
Table 2: Summary of reproducibility of stylized facts in Speculation Game.
Stylized fact Reproducibility
Volatility clustering +
Intermittency +
Heavy tails +
Absence of autocorrelation in returns +
Slow decay of autocorrelation in volatilities +
Volume/volatility correlation +
Aggregational Gaussianity +
Conditional heavy tails +
Asymmetry in time scales +
Leverage effect +
Gain/loss asymmetry −
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For future research, it is essential to investigate why and how the stylized
properties of asset returns are reproduced in the current model. Although vari-
ous parameter sets, including the baseline case showed in this study, bring about
the state of volatility clustering, with certain parameter combinations (e.g., an
overly large memory M), Speculation Game would fail to yield any intermit-
tent volatilities, or even enter the extreme state in some cases. Therefore, the
parameter conditions for the emergence of stylized facts should be clarified in
a more detailed manner. Moreover, the time series displayed in Figure 2 re-
minds one the important property of multifractality. It should be worthwhile to
study Hurst exponents of returns at various time horizons or to do more robust
multifractal analyses by employing the multifractal detrending moving average
(MFDMA) [69] or multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MFDFA) [70].
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Appendix A. The absence of herding behavior
The absence of herding can be confirmed by observing two time series ob-
tained in the simulation, as shown in Figure A.1. These results demonstrate
that fluctuations in the numbers of players who submit orders are stable, and
the numbers of buyer and seller are almost balanced with each other. The situ-
ation does not change much when M varies from 3 to 7. If the herding behavior
can be defined as the spontaneously synchronized action of the players in the
game, one may say that such a phenomenon is absent in the current model.
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Figure A.1: The numbers of players who submit (a) buy and (b) sell orders fluctuate constantly
for the whole time period. The average numbers are almost constant, which means the number
of total ordered players are incessantly present around N/3 ∼ N/2.
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Appendix B. The extreme state
When the board lot amount B is very low, the system will reach the extreme
state in which the market price change ∆p bursts irregularly with tremendous
amplitudes, as shown in Figure B.2. These tremendous price changes can make
the market price p(t) negative, however, the intermittent appearance is almost
the same as the state of volatility clustering.
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Figure B.2: Time series of price changes when Speculation Game enters the extreme state
(N = 1000, M = 5, S = 2, B = 1, C = 3).
References
[1] R. Cont, Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized facts and statistical
issues, QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 1 (2001) 223–236.
[2] T. Bollerslev, Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity,
Journal of econometrics 31 (3) (1986) 307–327.
[3] R. N. Mantegna, H. E. Stanley, Introduction to econophysics: correlations
and complexity in finance, Cambridge university press, 1999.
[4] R. G. Palmer, W. B. Arthur, J. H. Holland, B. LeBaron, P. Tayler, Artifi-
cial economic life: a simple model of a stockmarket, Physica D: Nonlinear
Phenomena 75 (1) (1994) 264–274.
30
[5] W. B. Arthur, J. H. Holland, B. LeBaron, R. G. Palmer, P. Tayler, As-
set pricing under endogenous expectations in an artificial stock market,
Available at SSRN 2252.
[6] B. LeBaron, W. B. Arthur, R. Palmer, Time series properties of an artificial
stock market, Journal of Economic Dynamics and control 23 (9) (1999)
1487–1516.
[7] M. Raberto, S. Cincotti, S. M. Focardi, M. Marchesi, Agent-based simula-
tion of a financial market, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Appli-
cations 299 (1) (2001) 319–327.
[8] M. Raberto, S. Cincotti, S. M. Focardi, M. Marchesi, Traders’ long-run
wealth in an artificial financial market, Computational Economics 22 (2-3)
(2003) 255–272.
[9] R. Cont, J.-P. Bouchaud, Herd behavior and aggregate fluctuations in fi-
nancial markets, Macroeconomic dynamics 4 (02) (2000) 170–196.
[10] D. Stauffer, T. Penna, Crossover in the cont–bouchaud percolation model
for market fluctuations1, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applica-
tions 256 (1-2) (1998) 284–290.
[11] D. Sornette, W.-X. Zhou, Importance of positive feedbacks and overconfi-
dence in a self-fulfilling ising model of financial markets, Physica A: Statis-
tical Mechanics and its Applications 370 (2) (2006) 704–726.
[12] W.-X. Zhou, D. Sornette, Self-organizing ising model of financial markets,
The European Physical Journal B 55 (2) (2007) 175–181.
[13] T. Kaizoji, S. Bornholdt, Y. Fujiwara, Dynamics of price and trading vol-
ume in a spin model of stock markets with heterogeneous agents, Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 316 (1) (2002) 441–452.
[14] D. Sornette, Physics and financial economics (1776–2014): puzzles, ising
and agent-based models, Reports on progress in physics 77 (6) (2014)
062001.
31
[15] S. Mike, J. D. Farmer, An empirical behavioral model of liquidity and
volatility, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32 (1) (2008) 200–
234.
[16] G.-F. Gu, W.-X. Zhou, Emergence of long memory in stock volatility from
a modified mike-farmer model, EPL (Europhysics Letters) 86 (4) (2009)
48002.
[17] H. Meng, F. Ren, G.-F. Gu, X. Xiong, Y.-J. Zhang, W.-X. Zhou, W. Zhang,
Effects of long memory in the order submission process on the properties of
recurrence intervals of large price fluctuations, EPL (Europhysics Letters)
98 (3) (2012) 38003.
[18] J. Zhou, G.-F. Gu, Z.-Q. Jiang, X. Xiong, W. Chen, W. Zhang, W.-X. Zhou,
Computational experiments successfully predict the emergence of autocor-
relations in ultra-high-frequency stock returns, Computational Economics
50 (4) (2017) 579–594.
[19] K. Sznajd-Weron, Sznajd model and its applications, Acta Physica
Polonica B 36 (2005) 2537.
[20] K. Sznajd-Weron, R. Weron, A simple model of price formation, Interna-
tional Journal of Modern Physics C 13 (01) (2002) 115–123.
[21] T. Lux, M. Marchesi, Scaling and criticality in a stochastic multi-agent
model of a financial market, Nature 397 (6719) (1999) 498.
[22] D. Challet, Y.-C. Zhang, Emergence of cooperation and organization in an
evolutionary game, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
246 (3) (1997) 407–418.
[23] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Y. Zhang, Minority Games, Oxford finance, Oxford
University Press, 2005.
[24] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, Stylized facts of financial markets and
market crashes in minority games, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications 294 (3) (2001) 514–524.
32
[25] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Y.-C. Zhang, Minority games and stylized facts,
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 299 (1-2) (2001) 228–
233.
[26] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Criticality and market efficiency in a simple realistic
model of the stock market, Physical Review E 68 (3) (2003) 036132.
[27] J. V. Andersen, D. Sornette, The $-game, The European Physical Journal
B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems 31 (1) (2003) 141–145.
[28] D. Challet, Inter-pattern speculation: beyond minority, majority and $-
games, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32 (1) (2008) 85–100.
[29] D. Challet, A. Chessa, M. Marsili, Y. Zhang, From minority games to real
markets, QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 1 (2001) 168–176.
[30] T. Galla, Y.-C. Zhang, Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator dy-
namics, Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2009 (11)
(2009) P11012.
[31] J.-P. Bouchaud, I. Giardina, M. Me´zard, On a universal mechanism for
long-range volatility correlations, Quantitative Finance 1 (2) (2001) 212–
216.
[32] R. Manuca, Y. Li, R. Riolo, R. Savit, The structure of adaptive competition
in minority games, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
282 (3) (2000) 559–608.
[33] K. Katahira, E. Akiyama, Minority game in a heterogeneous population
with periodic participations, Journal of Information Processing Society of
Japan 58 (1) (2017) 269–277 [published in Japanese].
[34] W. B. Arthur, Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality, The American
economic review (1994) 406–411.
33
[35] F. F. Ferreira, M. Marsili, Real payoffs and virtual trading in agent based
market models, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
345 (3) (2005) 657–675.
[36] F. Chow, H. Chau, Multiple choice minority game, Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications 319 (2003) 601–615.
[37] A. Cavagna, Irrelevance of memory in the minority game, Physical Review
E 59 (4) (1999) R3783.
[38] P. Jefferies, M. Hart, P. Hui, N. F. Johnson, From market games to real-
world markets, The European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and
Complex Systems 20 (4) (2001) 493–501.
[39] N. F. Johnson, P. Jefferies, P. M. Hui, et al., Financial market complexity,
Oxford University Press, 2003.
[40] F. Patzelt, K. Pawelzik, An inherent instability of efficient markets, Scien-
tific reports 3 (2013) 2784.
[41] S. De, N. R. Gondhi, V. Mangla, B. Pochiraju, Success/failure of past
trades and trading behavior of investors.
[42] T. H. Rydberg, Realistic statistical modelling of financial data, Interna-
tional Statistical Review 68 (3) (2000) 233–258.
[43] N. Platt, E. Spiegel, C. Tresser, On-off intermittency: A mechanism for
bursting, Physical Review Letters 70 (3) (1993) 279.
[44] A. Clauset, C. R. Shalizi, M. E. Newman, Power-law distributions in em-
pirical data, SIAM review 51 (4) (2009) 661–703.
[45] P. Gopikrishnan, V. Plerou, Y. Liu, L. N. Amaral, X. Gabaix, H. E. Stan-
ley, Scaling and correlation in financial time series, Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications 287 (3) (2000) 362–373.
34
[46] P. Gopikrishnan, M. Meyer, L. N. Amaral, H. E. Stanley, Inverse cubic
law for the distribution of stock price variations, The European Physical
Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems 3 (2) (1998) 139–140.
[47] Q. H. Vuong, Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested
hypotheses, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1989) 307–
333.
[48] C. S. Gillespie, Fitting heavy tailed distributions: The poweRlaw package,
Journal of Statistical Software 64 (2) (2015) 1–16.
URL http://www.jstatsoft.org/v64/i02/
[49] B. G. Malkiel, E. F. Fama, Efficient capital markets: A review of theory
and empirical work, The journal of Finance 25 (2) (1970) 383–417.
[50] G. Zumbach, The riskmetrics 2006 methodology.
[51] G. Zumbach, Characterizing heteroscedasticity, in: Discrete Time Series,
Processes, and Applications in Finance, Springer, 2013, pp. 181–196.
[52] H. Bessembinder, P. J. Seguin, Price volatility, trading volume, and market
depth: Evidence from futures markets, Journal of financial and Quantita-
tive Analysis 28 (1) (1993) 21–39.
[53] G.-m. Chen, M. Firth, O. M. Rui, The dynamic relation between stock
returns, trading volume, and volatility, Financial Review 36 (3) (2001)
153–174.
[54] A. Antypas, P. Koundouri, N. Kourogenis, Aggregational gaussianity and
barely infinite variance in financial returns, Journal of Empirical Finance
20 (2013) 102–108.
[55] I. Amien, K. Rajaratnam, R. Kruger, Inference of aggregational gaussianity
in asset returns exhibiting a paretian-distribution, Procedia Economics and
Finance 25 (2015) 400–407.
35
[56] C. S. Bos, P. Janus, S. J. Koopman, Spot variance path estimation and
its application to high-frequency jump testing, Journal of Financial Econo-
metrics (2012) nbr013.
[57] T. Bollerslev, A conditionally heteroskedastic time series model for spec-
ulative prices and rates of return, The review of economics and statistics
(1987) 542–547.
[58] D. B. Nelson, Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new ap-
proach, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1991) 347–370.
[59] J. Oden, K. Hurt, S. Gentry, A new class of heavy-tailed distribution and
the stock market returns in germany, Research in Business and Manage-
ment 4 (2) (2017) 13–18.
[60] U. A. Mu¨ller, M. M. Dacorogna, R. D. Dave´, R. B. Olsen, O. V. Pictet,
J. E. von Weizsa¨cker, Volatilities of different time resolutions - analyzing
the dynamics of market components, Journal of Empirical Finance 4 (2)
(1997) 213–239.
[61] V. V. Gavrishchaka, S. B. Ganguli, Volatility forecasting from multiscale
and high-dimensional market data, Neurocomputing 55 (1) (2003) 285–305.
[62] J.-P. Bouchaud, A. Matacz, M. Potters, Leverage effect in financial mar-
kets: The retarded volatility model, Physical review letters 87 (22) (2001)
228701.
[63] J.-P. Bouchaud, M. Potters, More stylized facts of financial markets: lever-
age effect and downside correlations, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and
its Applications 299 (1-2) (2001) 60–70.
[64] P. T. H. Ahlgren, M. H. Jensen, I. Simonsen, R. Donangelo, K. Sneppen,
Frustration driven stock market dynamics: Leverage effect and asymmetry,
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 383 (1) (2007) 1–4.
36
[65] M. H. Jensen, A. Johansen, I. Simonsen, Inverse statistics in economics: the
gain–loss asymmetry, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
324 (1) (2003) 338–343.
[66] R. Donangelo, M. H. Jensen, I. Simonsen, K. Sneppen, Synchronization
model for stock market asymmetry, Journal of Statistical Mechanics: The-
ory and Experiment 2006 (11) (2006) L11001.
[67] I. Simonsen, M. H. Jensen, A. Johansen, Optimal investment horizons, The
European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems
27 (4) (2002) 583–586.
[68] D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk, Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society (1979) 263–291.
[69] G.-F. Gu, W.-X. Zhou, Detrending moving average algorithm for multi-
fractals, Physical Review E 82 (1) (2010) 011136.
[70] E. A. F. E. Ihlen, Introduction to multifractal detrended fluctuation anal-
ysis in matlab, Frontiers in physiology 3 (2012) 141.
37
